Wednesday, February 20, 2008

the mind can doubt

the mind can doubt everything... except itself.

before the mind invokes any form of logic to dispute the validity of any argument, it needs to believe it is capable of doing so - i.e. it must assume it may invoke logic.

before the mind phrases its proposed method of disputing the imagined argument, it needs to believe it is capable of doing so - i.e. it must assume it may phrase sentences.

before the mind considers its ability to coin sequences of meaning for any imagined purpose, it needs to believe it is capable of doing so - i.e. it must assume it may consider.

albeit seemingly a mere paraphrase of Descartes, this negative postulation - that "i cannot be if i do not think i can be" - is so much more absolute and compelling. it illuminates an ineluctable precursor to human reasoning: that of Belief in Thought. how can one think if one does not believe it possible? and yet, that very thought is, in itself, remarkably self-contradictory! even if i do not believe it possible that i am thinking, another part of me squirms in protest: are you not caught in the very act of "thinking" there and then? it thus seems that the only way to nullify this strident statement is to deceive oneself.

thusly, the entire statement seems to cave in on itself - declaring its self-contained argument rather moot by any standard of scrutiny. yet, one cannot help but revisit this quaint declaration and note that faint scent of Truth: can the non-believer execute that which he does not believe in? can the mind operate if it were to doubt its very existence? would any of this messy collective of verbs and nouns persuade you should you doubt they could?

... could you say "there is a spoon", when you are empty-handed?

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

If by "be", you refer to ontological presence,then you are wrong in the statement "I cannot be if I do not think I can be". It simply is the case the "I" cannot know my own existence". A rock exists w/o knowing it exists. Unless you mean you are talking about an epistemological issue rather than an ontological one.